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Sequential Investment in Site-Specific Crop Management Under Output Price Uncertainty: 




Conventional farm management practices apply nitrogen and other fertilizers uniformly 
across fields. Because the fertility and quality of soil tend to vary within a field, this practice can 
lead to over-application of chemicals, low rates of nutrient up-take, and high levels of nitrate 
runoff, in at least some parts of the field. Recent technological advances in site-specific crop 
management (SSCM) are making it possible for farmers to acquire detailed information about 
the spatial characteristics of their fields and target fertilizer applications to meet spatially varying 
needs. This has the potential to improve yields, reduce fertilizer costs and reduce nitrogen 
residuals in the soil. However, the decision to adopt SSCM is complicated by at least two factors. 
First, there is the potential to profitably adopt different components of the technology 
sequentially or jointly as a package. Second, some components require a large sunk cost, which 
must be made in the face of revenue uncertainty. This paper presents a method to analyze 
adoption of interrelated components of a technology under output price uncertainty and applies 
that method to analyze the use of green payments to encourage adoption of SSCM to reduce 
nitrogen pollution. 
SSCM relies on several interrelated technologies which include diagnostic tools such as 
grid-based soil testing that gathers information about soil conditions and variable rate technology 
(VRT) that uses computerized fertilizer spreaders linked to Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 
systems to apply fertilizer at a variable rate on-the-go in the field to meet location specific needs. 
Information gathering through soil testing must occur before fertilizer can be applied using VRT 
and therefore these components need to be adopted sequentially. However, farmers have a choice 
of either adopting SSCM as a package by adopting VRT immediately after soil testing or  2
adopting it piecemeal by adopting soil testing and delaying or not adopting VRT at all.  
Recent surveys of farmers show that the current rates of adoption of SSCM as a package 
are low and that farmers appear to be adopting the technology piecemeal or stepwise (see 
Khanna et al., 1999a). For example, 37% of the surveyed farmers in the Midwest had adopted 
soil testing but only 12% had adopted VRT for fertilizer application. Uncertainties about the 
returns of SSCM and its high costs of adoption ranked as two important reasons for non-adoption 
by a majority of the farmers.  
Uncertainties about the returns from adoption could arise for several reasons, such as 
uncertainty about output prices, yields, and weather. Output price uncertainty is likely to increase 
in the future with the dismantling of government supply controls and price stabilizing programs 
by the FAIR Act of 1996 (Ray et al.). As evidence of this, corn prices rose to a ten-year high in 
1996 and fell by 40% to a five-year low in 1998. While returns from SSCM are uncertain, 
investment in some components involves high sunk costs. Since SSCM is still in its infancy and 
undergoing rapid improvement, the resulting technological obsolescence of existing equipment 
makes it unlikely for farmers to recover their sunk costs if the investment was to be liquidated 
due to a downward turn in revenues.  
Many studies have analyzed the economic and environmental impacts of adoption of soil 
testing (Schnitkey et al.; Babcock et al.) or SSCM as a technology package (Thrikawala et al.; 
Schnitkey et al.; Watkins et al.; Babcock and Pautsch).  These studies treat adoption as a one-
time decision and rely on the traditional net present value (NPV) method in their analysis, 
assuming implicitly that future returns and costs are certain or that the investment is reversible.  
In the case of SSCM sequential adoption is attractive because the gains from adoption of VRT 
depend on the extent of spatial variability in soil conditions, which can only be determined after 
farmers undertake soil testing. A few studies (Feder; Leathers and Smale) show that differences  3
in fixed costs, risk aversion or the need for learning about a technology can lead farmers to adopt 
certain components of a technological package before others. However, these studies do not 
examine the optimal timing of adoption of interrelated components under uncertainty. This paper 
extends work on sequential adoption by introducing uncertainty using the option value approach 
of Dixit and Pindyck and by applying the model of sequential investment under uncertainty to 
SSCM. 
While a growing body of work uses the option value approach to explain the timing of 
adoption of agricultural technologies (Purvis et al.; Winter-Nelson and Amegbetto; Price and 
Wetzstein; Khanna et al., 1999b), these papers analyze adoption of an indivisible technology. 
Bar-Ilan and Strange analyze the optimal timing of sequential investment in a two-stage project, 
but their model does not allow for simultaneous adoption of all components or for returns from 
the adoption of individual components, both of which are possible with SSCM.  
This paper has three purposes. First, it adapts the Dixit and Pindyck option value 
approach to examine the extent to which output price uncertainty and high sunk costs interact to 
create incentives to delay adoption of site-specific technologies and to adopt them piecemeal 
rather than as a package
1. It also undertakes an assessment of the impacts of heterogeneity in soil 
conditions on the optimal timing of adoption of each of the components. Second, the paper 
assesses the extent to which the NPV rule provides misleading predictions of adoption rates by 
ignoring uncertainty and the option to delay investment and assesses the degree to which 
ignoring piecemeal adoption within the option value approach misrepresents the returns to 
SSCM.  
                                                 
1 While the services of some of the equipment for SSCM can be custom-hired, several components such as yield 
monitors need to be owner-purchased, while others such as soil testing and mapping involve one time sunk costs. 
While custom-hiring of some of the services of VRT could reduce the sunk costs of adoption, they are still 
significantly high. 
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Third, the paper examines the implications of output price uncertainty and high sunk 
costs on the design of cost-share subsidies to achieve pollution reduction by accelerating 
adoption. Various federal farm programs such as Environmental Quality Incentives Program 
seek to encourage farmers to adopt improved nutrient management practices by offering them 
green payments. This paper analyzes the optimal targeting of these subsidies across 
heterogeneous soil conditions as well as how these subsidies should differ in their incentives for 
adoption of soil testing and VRT. The framework developed here is applied to timing and 
implications of adoption of SSCM for corn production using production and pollution 
relationships calibrated to soil conditions in Illinois.  
  The paper shows that recognition of the possibility of investing in soil testing and VRT 
sequentially lowers the threshold value of required net returns to invest in soil testing. Since the 
sunk cost of adopting soil testing is smaller than that of investing in VRT, the possibility of 
delaying or never adopting VRT makes farmers more willing to invest in soil testing to explore 
the benefits of SSCM, than to adopt the complete technology in one step. The NPV rule over-
predicts adoption of both soil testing and VRT. The analysis also shows that adoption of both 
soil testing and VRT reduces nitrogen pollution with a large part of this reduction achieved by 
simply adopting soil testing. Recognizing the option value of investment but ignoring the 
potential for stepwise adoption would tend to under-predict the adoption of soil testing and over-
predict the adoption of VRT. It would also lead to an underestimation of the required subsidy for 
inducing immediate adoption of VRT and overestimation of that required for soil testing. Cost-
share subsidies to accelerate the adoption of VRT would be most effective at reducing nitrogen 
pollution if targeted towards fields with low average soil quality and high spatial variability in 
soil fertility or soil quality. The next section presents the theoretical framework to analyze 
sequential investment decisions. Section 3 describes the data used in the numerical simulation.  5
The results of the simulation are in Section 4 followed by the conclusions.  
 
2. Theoretical Model 
We consider a profit-maximizing farmer operating a field of A acres. Soil fertility levels 
vary within the field and the distribution of soil fertility is represented by a probability density 
function,  ) (z g  with mean µ  and variance 
2 σ . The level of soil fertility ranges from a lower 
bound l to an upper bound u. Assuming a constant returns to scale crop response function, the 
yield per acre (y) at any time (t) is described as
2: ) , ( t t t x z f y = , where z represents the soil 
fertility level per acre and x is the applied input per acre. We assume that fz>0, fx>0, fzz<0, and 
fxx<0. The farmer has a discrete choice between three alternatives: (a) using the conventional 
application practices, (b) adopting soil testing only, or (c) adopting both soil testing and VRT. 
These choices are denoted by superscripts C, S, and B, respectively. The farmer is assumed to be 
a price-taker in the input and output market. Output price Pt is assumed to be changing over time 
and the farmer has expectations of these prices in the future. Input price w is assumed to be 






t K K K + = , where the superscript V denotes VRT. These costs are assumed to decline over 
time at the rates 
S δ  and δ










δ − = 0 . 
The lifetime of the equipment for variable rate application is T  years and the discount rate is ρ .  
In order to examine the environmental implications of SSCM, we assume that a part of 
the applied input is absorbed by the crop and converted into dry grain matter, θ yt (as in Barry et 
al.; Thrikawala et al.). The rest of the applied input may be carried over in the soil and change 
                                                 
2 Since we are assuming that time is a continuous variable, the time dependent variables should be denoted as X(t). 
However, for the ease of exposition we are denoting them as Xt.  6
the level of soil fertility by z   per acre and/or generate polluting run-off (Rt) per acre: 
  z y x R t t t  − − =      θ .                                                                      (1) 
Decision Problem under Certainty   
  The optimal adoption decision under certainty requires that the farmer adopt a technology 
if the difference in the present value of the quasi-rents (revenue minus variable costs) with and 
without adoption is greater than the additional fixed costs of adoption. This decision making 
process involves forecasting the optimal stream of expected returns with the conventional 
application practices, with soil testing alone, and with both soil testing and VRT, and comparing 
them to each other and the fixed costs of adoption.   
Under the conventional application practices, the farmer lacks information about the 
distribution of soil fertility in the field but uses a small sample of soil tests to estimate the 
average soil fertility µ  in the field. The farmer then chooses the optimal level of input use per 
acre for the whole field by maximizing the discounted value of expected quasi-rents, 
C
0 π , as 
follows:   
() dt wx x f P E A e t t t t
T t
t x
C − = 
− ) , ( ) ( max
0 0 µ π
ρ .                                 (2) 
Optimal input use per acre is determined such that  
0 ) , ( ) (
0 = − =
∂
∂
w x f P E
x





.                                                     (3) 
where E denotes the expectations operator based on the subjective probability distribution of 
future prices given the information available at time t=0. The optimal amount of input use per 
acre is obtained as  ) , ), ( ( t t
C
t w P E x x µ = .  7
Soil testing provides the farmer with information about the distribution of soil fertility 
) (z g  which can be used to choose a single rate of input use for the whole field to maximize the 
expected value of discounted quasi-rents, 
S
0 π :  
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The optimal uniform input application per acre is determined such that 
()0 ) ( ) , ( ) (
0 = − =
∂
∂
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.                                                          (5) 
Because the optimal input application per acre depends on the distribution of soil fertility, 
)) ( , ), ( ( z g w P E x x t
S
t = .  
The adoption of both soil testing and VRT makes it possible for the farmer to apply the 
input at a spatially varying rate across the field. The farmer chooses the optimal level of xt given 
the soil fertility zt to maximize the discounted quasi-rents as: 
() dt dz z g wx z x f P E A e
Tu
l
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.                         (7) 
The optimal input level at any point in the field depends on the soil fertility level at that point; 
thus  ) , ), ( ( t t
B
t z w P E x x = .   
  The optimal input levels with each technology obtained using conditions (3), (5) and (7) 





S C π π and 
*
0  
B π  respectively. 
The present value of the quasi-rent differential from adopting soil testing only is denoted by 
()





0 0 , ), ( , , ,
C B B A T z g w P N π π µ − = . We can disaggregate the quasi-rent differential due to 
adoption of both soil testing and VRT to obtain the quasi-rent differential due to adoption of 
VRT as: 
S B V N N N 0 0 0 − = . The quasi-rent differentials 
B N0  and 
S N0  are always non-negative 
since input choice with either soil testing or both components is based on more information and 
fewer constraints. We would expect these quasi-rent differentials to increase when the variability 
in the soil fertility distribution increases. 
  Under the NPV rule, the choice between adopting a site-specific technology and the 
conventional production practices would be based on a comparison of the costs of investment 
and the present value of the differential in quasi-rents. It would be optimal to adopt both 
components of SSCM as a package at t=0 if 
B B K N 0 0 >  and 
V V K N 0 0 > . Adoption of only soil 
testing would be optimal if 
S S K N 0 0 >  and 
V V K N 0 0 < .   
 
Sequential Investment under Uncertainty 
Suppose that the quasi-rent differentials, 
B
T N , 
V
T N  and 
S
T N , are uncertain due to 
uncertainty about output prices. In order to keep our analysis tractable, we assume that these 
quasi-rent differentials evolve as a geometric Brownian motion 
j j j j j j dz N dt N dN σ α + =                          j=S, V,B                             (8)                         
where dz is the increment of a Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance; α  is the drift 
parameter; and σ  reflects the volatility in the drift parameter.  
  The decision problem is to determine the optimal time T ￿  at which to adopt soil testing 
and the optimal time T
~ at which to adopt VRT where  T T ￿ ~
≥  due to sequential nature of the two 
decisions. This decision problem is transformed into a two-stage sequential investment in which 
the first stage involves the decision to adopt soil testing and the second stage involves the  9
decision to adopt VRT. We use backward induction to first solve the second stage investment 
problem and then use it to solve the first stage problem. In the second stage, we determine T
~ by 
maximizing the discounted net returns from adoption of VRT. Net returns are defined as the 
difference between the quasi-rent differential, 
V
T N  and the fixed costs of adoption of VRT and 
are represented by: 







V e K N E N F
ρ − − = ) ( .                                                                                         (9) 
) N ( F
V
T ~
V  may be thought of as the value of the option to invest in VRT. This option value is 
only available to those who have invested in soil testing. Assuming risk neutrality, (9) is 
maximized subject to the condition in (8) with j=V. The solution to this problem that is found 
using dynamic programming shows that it is optimal to invest in VRT at T
~ when the critical 
value of the quasi-rent differential  * N
V





































β .                (10)  
The investment rule under uncertainty and irreversibility requires 
V
T N  to be greater than 
V
T K  by a 








. This factor is a positive function of the growth rate and the volatility of the 
growth rate in 
V
T N  as indicated by (8), and a negative function of the discount rate. It varies with 
the characteristics of soil distribution, and indicates the level of caution that should be applied to 
the adoption decision due to the price uncertainty and irreversible nature of the investment.  
 Given  ) N ( F
V
T ~
V , the optimal time to invest in soil testing is found by maximizing the net 
returns from soil testing subject to (8) with j=S as: 









S N F e K N E N F + − =
− ρ .                                                                      (11)  10
The solution to the maximization problem in (11) shows that the optimal time T ￿  to invest in soil 
testing is when the critical value of the quasi-rent differential due to soil testing is 
















.                                                                                        (12)  
The critical value of the quasi-rent differential required to induce investment in soil testing 






, an increase in the fixed costs of soil testing, and a decrease 
in the value of the option to invest in VRT. The anticipation of high returns from subsequent 
adoption of VRT creates incentives for investment in soil testing even when the quasi-rent 
differential due to soil testing is less than its fixed costs. If the solution to the above two-stage 
problem shows that T
~>T ￿  then the optimal decision is to adopt soil testing at time T ￿  and to 
delay the adoption of VRT till T
~. When the optimal time to invest in soil testing and VRT is 
T T ￿ ~
= , it is optimal to adopt both components at the same time.  
A decision rule that ignores the possibility of adopting the components stepwise imposes 
the constraint that  T T ￿ ~
= . This requires the adoption of VRT immediately after the adoption of 
soil testing. If piecemeal adoption were prohibited or if these two technologies were bundled 
together as a package, the optimal time T to invest in both soil testing and VRT would be 
obtained by maximizing the net returns from both soil testing and VRT subject to (8) with j=B:  







B e K N E N F
ρ − − = ) ( .                                                                                       (13) 
The solution to (13) shows that the critical value of the quasi-rent differential at which it is 












.                                                    (14)  
A cost-share subsidy may be used to induce adoption when it is not optimal to invest in  11
soil testing and VRT immediately. Under the NPV rule, the required cost-share subsidy for 
immediate investment is the difference between the present value of quasi-rent differential and 
the cost of investment when the former is greater than the latter. Under the option value 
approach, when the possibility of stepwise adoption is recognized, the subsidy required for 
immediate investment differs for soil testing and VRT. The required cost-share subsidy for soil 
testing if 
S S N N 0
*













.                                                                                   (15) 
The required subsidy for VRT if 
V V N N 0
*








− = .                                                                                                (16) 
If SSCM is treated as a package and 
B B N N 0
*
0 > , the subsidy required to induce immediate 








− = .                                                                                                (17) 
The subsidy required to induce adoption of site-specific technologies depends on the net 
present value of quasi-rent differentials 
j N0 , the option value of investment and the costs of 
investment. The quasi-rent differential and the option value, and therefore the subsidy required 
for immediate adoption as indicated by (15)-(17) vary with the distribution of soil characteristics. 
The required subsidy under the option value approach is always higher than that under the NPV 
rule because of the need to compensate for option values for given soil conditions. The total 
subsidy for immediate investment in both soil testing and VRT as a package 
B H  could be lower 
or higher than the total subsidy under the sequential investment rule,( )
V S H H +  depending on  12






 and  ) N ( F
V
T
V . This is an empirical question, and we examine that by 
developing a simulation model for corn production in Illinois.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis considers three fertilizer inputs; nitrogen (XN), potassium (XP) and 
phosphorus (XK) applied to corn production under Illinois conditions on a 500-acre farm field. 
These 500 acres are divided into 200 plots with an area of 2.5 acres each. Soil conditions on the 
farm are characterized by two features ￿ soil fertility and soil quality. Soil fertility is defined in 
terms of the levels of phosphorus and potassium in the soil. Soil quality depends on 
characteristics such as organic matter and the sand and clay content of soil. These characteristics 
determine the productivity of the soil and its maximum potential yield per acre under given 
climatic conditions. This study does not consider the possibility of measuring residual nitrogen in 
the soil since soil nitrate tests have not been found to be successful in accurately measuring and 
predicting the available nitrogen in the soil under Illinois conditions (Illinois Agronomy 
Handbook). Nitrogen requirements of the crop depend on the quality of the soil as represented by 
its maximum potential yield.  
The level of phosphorus is assumed to range from 10 lbs per acre to 180 lbs per acre 
while the level of potassium is assumed to range from 120 lbs per acre to 680 lbs per acre 
(Illinois Agronomy Handbook).  Maximum potential yields on Illinois soils vary between 60 
bushels per acre and 200 bushels per acre (Olson and Lang). The distributions of soil nutrient 
levels of phosphorus and potassium and the distribution of soil quality are characterized by 
appropriately scaled Beta distributions (as in Caswell et al. and Dai et al.). Alternative soil 
conditions are simulated by changing the means and variances of the Beta distributions. Two 
alternative mean levels (low and high) of soil fertility are considered with three alternative  13
coefficients of variation of the soil fertility distribution (CVF). Similarly, two alternative soil 
quality distributions are considered with low and high levels of average potential yield. Each of 
these distributions is characterized by two alternative coefficients of variation of the soil quality 
distribution (CVQ).  
  A modified Mitscherlich-Baule yield response function is used to represent the functional 
relationship between crop yields and three fertilizer inputs: nitrogen, phosphorous, and 
potassium (as in Schnitkey et al.). Frank et al. and Dai et al. use experimental data on corn yields 
to demonstrate the validity of the Mitscherlich-Baule function relative to other more restrictive 
functional forms such as von Liebeg, quadratic, and cubic. We used data from the Illinois 
Agronomy Handbook to calibrate the Mitscherlich-Baule production function with inputs 
nitrogen, potassium, and phosphorous and obtained: 
  ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 (
)) (   012 . 0 115 . 0 ( )) (   1 . 0 28 . 0 ( )   025 . 0 51 . 0 ( iK iK iP iP iN
i i
z x e z x e x e h y
+ + − + + − + − − − − =         (18) 
where  i h  represents the maximum potential yield; and ZiP and ZiK represent the amount of 
phosphorus and potassium (respectively) present in the soil in plot i=1,￿,200.  
  The soil fertility carryover equation (1) for phosphorus and potassium is calibrated based 
on recommendations in the Illinois Agronomy Handbook. It is assumed that 0.43 lb. of 
phosphate and 0.28 lb. of potash are removed from the soil per bushel of harvested corn. It is 
also assumed that 9 lbs. of phosphate increase the nutrient level of phosphorus by 1 lb. per acre 
while 4 lbs. of potash increase the nutrient level of potassium by 1 lb. per acre. Applied 
phosphorus and potassium in excess of those absorbed by plants are carried over by the soil and 
raise soil fertility levels for the next crop
3. In the case of nitrogen we assume that 0.75 lbs. of 
                                                 
3 Phosphorus and potassium are not mobile nutrients and usually remain in the soil and contribute to environmental 
contamination only through soil erosion (Illinois Agronomy Handbook, Schnitkey et al.). 
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applied nitrogen are absorbed by a bushel of corn and that all excess nitrogen in the soil is 
potentially available for leaching (Barry et al.).  
  SSCM is defined here to include soil testing and sampling that is typically done once in 
four years as well as the adoption of variable rate application technology and yield monitors. We 
assume that subsequent to the initial soil testing, the farmer tracks the spatial variability in soil 
conditions in the field by using a yield monitor and uses that to guide the spatially varying input 
applications with VRT. The cost of grid soil sampling and testing at the 2.5 acre level is $6.4 per 
acre or $3200 for the 500 acres. The yield-monitoring bundle includes a yield monitor with 
moisture sensors, a GPS receiver, a field marker, mapping software and memory cards and is 
sold by Ag Leader for $7855. The variable rate application equipment together with the 
application software can be purchased for $12,345. Annual costs of maintenance and repair are 
assumed to be 1% of the equipment cost. Finally, farmers adopting SSCM need to undergo 
training in the use of equipment, which is a one-time sunk cost at the time of adoption. The total 
cost of the package of VRT is $22, 243.  
All equipment costs are assumed to decline in real terms by 5% per annum while costs of 
custom hire services and soil testing are assumed to decline by 3% per annum. Discount rate is 
assumed to be 5% while the lifetime of the equipment is assumed to be 5 years. Prices of 
nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium are assumed to be at their 1997 levels of $0.2/lb, $0.24/lb 
and $0.13/lb respectively.  
The stochastic nature of the discounted quasi-rent differentials in (8) arises from 
uncertainty in the output prices. To characterize the price uncertainty and support the assumption 
that 
j
T N  evolves as a geometric Brownian motion, we analyze the long run behavior of output 
prices by examining the historical data on real corn prices over the period 1926-1998 (USDA). 
We examine whether the output price process is non-stationary or stationary by conducting we  15
estimate Dickey-Fuller unit root test. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the price process is 
non-stationary. Hence, the output price process is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion 
represented by the following discrete approximation (Dixit and Pindyck, pp.72):    
t t t t P P P ν λ γ 1 1 ) 1 ( − − + + =                                   (19)              
where  γ  is the drift parameter; λ  is the standard deviation in the drift parameter; and  t ν  is a 
random variable with mean zero and unit variance. The value of γ , estimated as the average 
percentage changes in real corn prices between 1926-1998, is found to be -0.014. The standard 
deviation of the average percentage changes is estimated to be 0.223. This process is used to 
forecast prices for a 25-year period by assuming random shocks drawn from a standard normal 
distribution. These prices are used to forecast the discounted quasi-rent differential 
j
T N . A series 
of 
j
T N  is estimated for 25 years under each of the alternative assumptions about the parameters 
of the soil fertility and soil quality distributions. For each of these series we then estimate α  
j and 
σ  
j to characterize the stochastic process followed by 
j
T N  in (8). 
4. Results 
Implications of Adoption of Site-Specific Technologies for Quasi-Rent 
The impacts of alternative soil fertility and soil quality distributions on the average per 
acre discounted quasi-rents (revenue minus variable fertilizer costs) over the 5-year lifetime of 
the equipment with the conventional application practices, soil testing, and both soil testing and 
VRT are summarized in Table 1. Quasi-rents with all three adoption decisions increase as the 
average soil fertility within the field increases since that reduces the need to apply as much 
fertilizer. The quasi-rents also increase with an increase in the average level of soil quality since 
the increased soil quality increases the marginal productivity of inputs.  
  The adoption of both soil testing and VRT leads to an increase in quasi-rents, relative to  16
those with the conventional application practices, for all soil fertility and soil quality 
distributions, as expected from the theoretical analysis above (Table 1). As average soil quality 
increases, it leads to an increase in the uniform application rate for all inputs under the 
conventional practices. This increases costs more than it increases yields per acre and thus 
increases the gains in quasi-rent with adoption of one or both components of SSCM. An increase 
in the average level of soil fertility, on the other hand, reduces the quasi-rent differential of both 
soil testing and VRT since the yield gains and fertilizer cost savings with adoption decrease due 
to diminishing marginal productivity of inputs as soil fertility increases. An increase in the 
variation of soil quality and/or soil fertility increases the quasi-rent differential with both soil 
testing and VRT because it increases the proportion of the field constrained, under the 
conventional practices, to receiving less fertilizer in some parts of the field and more fertilizer in 
other parts of the field.  
  Hence, the levels of soil fertility and soil quality in the field work in opposite directions 
in their effect on the quasi-rent differentials with adoption of soil testing or both components. 
Increased variability in either, however, has a positive effect on these quasi-rent differentials. 
High average soil quality, low average soil fertility and high variability in both leads to higher 
quasi-rent differentials than low, high, and low, respectively. These results are consistent with 
the findings of other simulation studies that examine the impacts of adoption of soil testing and 
VRT on alternative soil fertility distributions (Thrikawala et al.) and alternative soil quality 
distributions (Babcock and Pautsch). While these studies focus on a single soil attribute, this 
paper shows that it is important to consider a combination of soil attributes when assessing the 
quasi-rent differential since some of these soil attributes interact in opposing ways. 
  Additionally, in this study we disaggregate the quasi-rent differential with adoption of 
both soil testing and VRT into that due to each of the components. The contribution of VRT to  17
the quasi-rent differential is greater than that of soil testing on all the soil distributions, with the 
exception of those with high average quality and low average fertility (Table 1). As expected, the 
incremental contribution of VRT to the total quasi-rent differential increases as the variability in 
soil conditions increases. The gains with the adoption of soil testing range between $3.3 per acre 
on the soils with high average quality and low average fertility and $25.7 per acre on the soils 
with low average fertility and high average quality. The incremental contribution of VRT ranges 
between $7.8 per acre and $29.2 per acre on these soils.  
  The discounted quasi-rent differentials of both soil testing and VRT exceed the fixed 
costs of adoption on most of the soil conditions considered here. As shown in the last column of 
Table1, according to the NPV rule that ignores uncertainty and irreversibility, adoption of both 
soil testing and VRT is preferred to the conventional application practices on all the soil 
conditions except on the soils with low average quality, 25% CVQ and 30% CVF. On such soil 
conditions, adoption of only soil testing is profitable. 
  
Optimal Timing of Adoption 
  We now examine the impacts of output price uncertainty on the optimal timing of 
adoption under the alternative assumptions of whether SSCM is adopted as a package or 
sequentially. The optimal timing of adoption of soil testing and VRT are obtained by calculating 
the critical values for investment, reflecting both the quasi-rent differentials and the option 
values associated with adoption. Recognizing the possibility of stepwise adoption, we calculate 
the critical values of soil testing and VRT using the factor  () 1 − β β  given in Table 2. This term 
() 1 − β β  reflects the degree to which the quasi-rent differential must exceed the investment 
costs before investment will occur, given uncertainty and sunk costs. The value of this factor 
varies with the distribution of soil characteristics within the field, indicating the role that soil  18
characteristics play in mitigating the effects of uncertainty on the adoption decision. For soil 
testing, this factor decreases as the average soil quality and variation in the soil quality increase 
while it increases with an increase in the average soil fertility and variability in the soil fertility. 
This occurs because increased average fertility increases the variation in the quasi-rent 
differential while increased average soil quality reduces the variation. The magnitude of 
() 1 − β β  for soil testing ranges from 1.4 on the low average fertility and quality soils to 3.4 on 
the high average fertility and quality soils. The values of  () 1 − β β  for VRT are higher than 
those of soil testing for all the soil distributions except for the high average quality and fertility 
soils. These values range from 1.7 on the high average fertility to 3.8 on the low average fertility 
soil (Table 2). 
  The analysis shows that the possibility of future adoption of VRT encourages immediate 
adoption of soil testing on all the soil distributions considered here. The reason is that the 
adoption of soil testing not only provides the benefits of determining the optimal single rate of 
input application for the field but also keeps alive the option to adopt VRT in the future. The 
value of the option to adopt VRT lowers the critical value of net returns at which adoption of soil 
testing is optimal and makes the immediate adoption of soil testing worthwhile. However, it is 
optimal to delay the adoption of VRT on most of the soil conditions. This is because high option 
values to VRT (due in part to the technology￿s high fixed costs) create critical values of net 
returns at which it is optimal to adopt that are much higher than the quasi-rent differentials. 
Immediate adoption (at year 1) of both soil testing and VRT is only worthwhile on soil 
distributions with high average quality, low average fertility and relatively high variability in 
both. Unlike the NPV rule, this decision rule recommends waiting 2 to 17 years before adopting  19
VRT on most of the soil distributions considered here
4 (Table 2). It recommends more waiting 
on the high average fertility and the low average quality soils with low variability in both. As the 
variability in these characteristic increases, the waiting time decrease substantially. 
  When the decision rule is constrained to adoption of VRT immediately after the adoption 
of soil testing, the total discounted quasi-rent differential must be 1.3 to 2.5 times greater than 
the total costs of investment, as indicated by the factor  () 1 − β β  (last column in Table 2). This 
factor also varies with the distribution of soil characteristics and in most cases lies in between the 
factor estimated separately for soil testing and for VRT. This implies that considering SSCM as a 
package underestimates the critical value of the quasi-rent differential at which it is optimal to 
adopt VRT while it overestimates the critical value of the quasi-rent differential of soil testing. It 
therefore tends to predict that adoption of VRT is profitable earlier than that predicted by the 
sequential analysis, particularly on soil distributions with low average quality and fertility (as 
shown in column 2 of Table 2). Hence, considering SSCM as a package results in poor 
predictions of optimal timing of adoption of soil testing and VRT.  
 
 
Implications of Soil Testing and VRT for Pollution Control 
  The impacts of adoption of soil testing and VRT on nitrogen pollution under alternative 
soil quality and soil fertility distributions are summarized in Table 3. Average per acre pollution 
levels with all three technology choices are higher on soil distributions characterized by the low 
average quality and the low average fertility, indicating that nitrogen uptake by plants on low 
                                                 
4 Impacts of an increase in discount rate on the timing of adoption are also analyzed. An increase in the discount rate 
from 5% to 10% has two effects. First, increased discount rate slightly reduces the value of  () 1 − β β , which 
would reduce the critical value at which it is optimal to invest. Second, it also reduces the discounted value of the 
quasi-rent differential marginally. Its net impact on the timing of adoption was therefore not found to be significant. 
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average quality soils is lower than on high average quality soils. As the variability in soil fertility 
and soil quality increases, input applications increase while the crop yields obtained decrease, 
which results in an increase in nitrogen pollution under all the technologies. However, the 
increase is much lower with the adoption of soil testing and VRT. Our analysis shows that 
adoption of soil testing and VRT reduces nitrogen pollution on all the soil distributions 
considered here (Table 3). Reductions of nitrogen pollution with the adoption of soil testing over 
the conventional application practices range from 9% on the low average fertility and quality 
soils to 34% on the high average fertility and quality soils. Total per acre pollution reductions 
with the adoption of both soil testing and VRT range between 12% and 55%. The analysis also 
indicates that the adoption of soil testing reduces nitrogen pollution more than the adoption of 
VRT, particularly on fields with low variability. 
  In order to examine the implications of output price uncertainty for the design of cost-
share subsidies to achieve pollution reduction by accelerating adoption, we estimate cost-share 
subsidies required for immediate adoption of soil testing and VRT as a percentage of the capital 
costs of adoption. Ignoring uncertainty and irreversibility, the NPV rule indicates that there is no 
need to offer a cost share subsidy for inducing adoption of soil testing and VRT on most of the 
soil conditions considered here (Table 3).  
  When the possibility of stepwise adoption is recognized under the option value approach, 
the analysis illustrates that although a cost-share subsidy is not necessary to induce immediate 
adoption of soil testing large subsidies are needed to induce immediate adoption of VRT. The 
required subsidy for VRT varies depending on the soil conditions. No subsidy is needed to 
induce the adoption of VRT on fields with relatively high soil quality, high soil fertility and high 
spatial variability in one or both. These are also the fields on which adoption of VRT would 
achieve high rates of reduction in nitrogen pollution. Among the other soil conditions considered  21
here, the pollution reduction per dollar of subsidy to adopt VRT is higher on fields with low soil 
quality but high variability in soil quality and/or those with high variability in soil fertility (last 
column of Table 3). A subsidy would be most effective at reducing pollution if targeted to these 
soil conditions.  
  Table 3 also presents the effects of ignoring the possibility of stepwise adoption on the 
required cost-share subsidies for immediate adoption. It indicates that there is a need to offer a 
cost-share subsidy to induce immediate adoption of both soil testing and VRT on many of the 
soil conditions considered here. Compared to the sequential decision making approach that offers 
different subsidy rates for soil testing and VRT, modeling SSCM as a package underestimates 
the required subsidy for immediate adoption of VRT while it overestimates the required subsidy 
for soil testing.    
 
5. Conclusions 
    This paper developed a model to analyze the adoption of interrelated technologies when 
fixed costs can generate option values to delaying investment and some components of the 
technological package can be profitably adopted independently. Application of the model to 
SSCM reveals the extent to which recognition of option values and the possibility of piecemeal 
adoption influence forecasts about adoption. In the case of SSCM, the model that accounts for 
uncertainty using the option value approach and sequential adoption provides a better 
explanation for the observed rates and pattern of adoption of SSCM than models based on the net 
present value rule. The more sophisticated model also yields more precise policy implications 
concerning green subsidies. 
  The results of the empirical model indicate that economic benefits of both soil testing and 
VRT are greater on fields with relatively high quality and low fertility soils with high variability.  22
The results also illustrate that the NPV rule predicts that farmers prefer to adopt both soil testing 
and VRT at the same time under most of the soil conditions considered here. However, 
recognition of the possibility of stepwise adoption under output price uncertainty indicates that it 
is preferable to first adopt soil testing but delay investment in VRT for 2 to 17 years unless the 
average soil quality is high and the variability in soil quality and soil fertility is relatively high.  
  The paper shows that the reduction in nitrogen pollution with adoption of SSCM is higher 
on the high average quality and fertility soils with relatively high variability. On some of these 
soil conditions immediate adoption of VRT is privately profitable even under the sequential 
adoption approach. On other soil conditions, a cost-share subsidy could be used to accelerate 
adoption. Considering the possibility of stepwise adoption, the option value method indicates 
that while a cost-share subsidy is not necessary to induce immediate adoption of soil testing, a 
subsidy is needed to induce immediate adoption of VRT, particularly on soil conditions with low 
average soil quality. Cost-share subsidies to accelerate the adoption of VRT would be most 
effective at reducing nitrogen pollution if targeted towards fields with low average soil quality 
and high spatial variability in soil quality and/or soil fertility. Ignoring the possibility of stepwise 
adoption under the option value approach leads to underestimation of the required subsidy for 
adoption of VRT and overestimation of the required subsidy for soil testing.   23
 Table 1.  Quasi-Rents under Alternative Soil Fertility and Soil Quality Distributions 
 
Soil Fertility  Discounted Average Annual 
Quasi-Rent 







































































LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ 










































HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ 


























































































Low soil fertility indicates that the average levels of Phosphorus and Potassium are 30 and 200lbs/acre, respectively. 
High soil fertility indicates that the average levels of Phosphorus and Potassium are 50 and 280lbs/acre, 
respectively. 
Low soil quality indicates an average potential yield of 130 bushels/acre. 
High soil quality indicates an average potential yield of 165 bushels/acre. 
1 In this column, A indicates that adoption of both soil testing and VRT is profitable while 
S A  indicates that 
adoption of only soil testing is profitable under the NPV rule  24
Table 2. Timing of Adoption of Soil Testing and VRT under Alternative Soil Fertility and  
   Soil Quality Distributions  
  
Soil Fertility  Sequential Adoption
 
() 1 − β β  
Level CVF 
(%) 















LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ 










































LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ 










































HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ 










































HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 40% CVQ 










































* indicates adoption is not profitable in the next 25 years 
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Table 3. Nitrogen Pollution and Cost-Share Subsidy Requirement for Immediate Adoption  
  under Alternative Soil Fertility and Soil Quality Distributions  
                     








Cost Share Subsidy 
Required 























LOW SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ 
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HIGH SOIL QUALITY WITH 25% CVQ 
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